

Labor, Credit, and Goods Markets:
The Macroeconomics of Search and Unemployment
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Contents

I Frictions in One Market: Labor	18
1 The benchmark model: a single worker firm	20
1.1 Matching and separation in the labor market	20
1.1.1 Matching	20
1.1.2 Separation	22
1.2 The job creation condition	22
1.2.1 Continuous time	23
1.2.2 Discrete time	25
1.3 Wages	26
1.3.1 Surplus and reservation wages	26
1.3.2 Surplus sharing and Nash bargaining over wages	27
1.4 Equilibrium	29
1.5 Further discussion of wages	31
1.5.1 Acceptance set of wages	31
1.5.2 Credible bargaining	32
1.5.3 Further wage alternatives	34
1.6 Endogenous job destruction	35
1.7 Discussion of literature and remaining issues	40
1.8 Chapter Appendix	42
1.8.1 Wage bargaining - Continuous time	42
1.8.2 Wage bargaining - Discrete time	42
1.8.3 Credible wage bargaining in steady-state	43
1.8.4 Endogenous job destruction - continuous time	44
1.8.5 Endogenous job destruction - discrete time	45
2 Business cycle properties	47
2.1 Dynamics of the benchmark model	48
2.1.1 Asymmetries in the cycle	49

2.2	A calibration	49
2.2.1	Calibrated parameters	50
2.2.2	The business cycle in the calibrated model	52
2.3	Volatility in alternative structures	54
2.3.1	Small labor surplus	55
2.3.2	Credible bargaining	55
2.3.3	Entry costs and amplification	56
2.4	Non-linear dynamics in the labor market	57
2.4.1	Solving models with search frictions	58
2.4.2	Impulse responses functions	59
2.4.3	Other non-linearities: the small surplus assumption and the zero bound for vacancies	61
2.5	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	62
2.6	Chapter Appendix	64
2.6.1	Log linearization	64
2.6.2	Labor market data	66
3	Efficiency in the labor market	68
3.1	Efficiency in continuous time	69
3.1.1	The Hosios condition with exogenous separations	69
3.1.2	Hosios inefficient separations vs surplus-inefficient separations	71
3.2	Competitive search equilibrium	73
3.3	A discussion of policy instruments	77
3.4	Efficiency in a discrete time dynamic setting	80
3.4.1	Hosios in a discrete setting	80
3.4.2	Constrained efficient fluctuations	82
3.5	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	83
3.6	Chapter's Appendix	86
3.6.1	Continuous time constrained efficiency: Baseline	86
3.6.2	Continuous time constrained efficiency: Endogenous job destruction	86
3.6.3	Moen's efficiency result	88
3.6.4	Coincidence of the wage in the decentralized equilibrium with entry costs and Moen's efficient wage	88
3.6.5	Hosios in discrete time	89
3.6.6	Efficient layoff taxes with endogenous separations	89
4	Firm size and strategic bargaining	91
4.1	Strategic bargaining with discrete labor	92
4.2	The large firm matching model with one type of worker	93
4.2.1	Firm's program and wage bargaining	93

4.2.2	Large-firm/small-firm equivalence result under constant returns to scale	94
4.2.3	An over-employment result under decreasing returns to scale	95
4.2.4	Second best efficiency	96
4.3	The large firm with several worker types	97
4.3.1	Environment	97
4.3.2	Wage solutions and equilibrium	98
4.3.3	Generalization: different bargaining weights and the “underemployment” result	100
4.4	Predetermined capital and labor with intrafirm bargaining	100
4.5	Dynamic implications of intrafirm bargaining	101
4.6	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	103
4.7	Chapter Appendix	105
4.7.1	Value function of the firms	105
4.7.2	Value function of workers and Nash-bargaining	105
4.7.3	Sketch of solution with identical bargaining power	106
4.7.4	Extension to capital	107
II	Frictions in Financial and Goods Markets	109
5	Credit and labor market frictions: the CL model	112
5.1	Random matching in financial markets	112
5.2	Integrating labor and financial market frictions	114
5.2.1	Projects, creditors and “the firm”	115
5.2.2	Entry in credit and labor markets	116
5.2.3	Bargaining over credit	118
5.2.4	Block bargaining over wages	120
5.2.5	Equilibrium	121
5.3	Hosios in the financial market	125
5.3.1	Social planner’s problem with frictional labor and credit markets	125
5.3.2	Socially optimal credit and labor market tightness	126
5.3.3	Hosios and the properties of the constrained efficient allocation	127
5.3.4	Properties of the constrained efficient allocation	128
5.4	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	129
5.5	Chapter Appendix	131
5.5.1	Appendix to Section 5.2.3, detail of the calculations of repayment ψ	131
5.5.2	Wage setting - block bargaining	131
5.5.3	Social planner’s problem	132
5.5.4	Alternative bargaining arrangements: varying the specificity in labor relationships	133

5.5.4.1	Endogenous job destruction	135
6	Financial multipliers and business cycles	137
6.1	The equilibrium dynamics of the CL model	138
6.1.1	Projects and creditors: asset values	138
6.1.2	Bargaining and equilibrium in the financial market	139
6.1.3	Job creation	140
6.1.4	Wage bargaining	141
6.2	A financial multiplier and the amplification of business cycles	142
6.2.1	Understanding amplification	142
6.2.2	Volatility and efficiency in financial markets	143
6.3	Quantitative properties	144
6.3.1	Calibration strategy	145
6.3.2	Quantitative moments and dynamics	147
6.4	Introducing shocks in financial markets	148
6.4.1	Parameterization and calibration	148
6.4.2	Stationary and business cycle moments	148
6.5	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	150
6.6	Chapter appendix	151
6.6.1	Deriving a Job Creation Condition	151
6.6.2	Financial repayment	152
6.6.3	Workers and Wages	152
6.6.4	An extended setup	153
6.6.5	Elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks	154
6.6.5.1	Financial frictions and a fixed wage	154
6.6.5.2	Financial multiplier - fixed wage	155
6.6.5.3	Flexible Wage - Financial Frictions	155
7	Goods market frictions: LG and CLG models	159
7.1	Search in goods markets	160
7.1.1	Timing and notations	160
7.1.2	Random matching in the goods market and goods market tightness	161
7.1.3	The new concepts in a search in the goods market economy	162
7.1.3.1	Unused production capacity	162
7.1.3.2	Transfers and Lucas trees	163
7.1.3.3	Utility, individual and aggregate consumption	163
7.2	The steady-state equilibrium in the LG model	163
7.2.1	Employment, consumption and goods market tightness	163

7.2.2	The job creation equation	165
7.2.3	Price determination	166
7.2.4	Wage determination	168
7.3	Efficiency and Hosios in the LG model	170
7.4	The CLG model	172
7.4.1	Job creation condition and equilibrium	173
7.4.2	Price, wage and payments to creditors	175
7.4.3	Efficiency in the CLG model	176
7.5	Extending the CLG model to endogenous effort	176
7.6	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	178
7.7	Chapter Appendix	180
7.7.1	Documenting consumption flows in CLG	180
7.7.1.1	The circular flows of income in the economy	180
7.7.1.2	Transfers and Lucas trees	180
7.7.1.3	Utility, individual and aggregate consumption	180
7.7.2	Stock-flow equations in the CLG model	181
7.7.3	Bellman equations in the CL model and free-entry	182
7.7.4	The viability of the decentralized CL economy	183
7.7.4.1	Viability of the goods market: the circular income flows	183
7.7.4.2	Viability of the assumption that only employed workers consume	183
7.7.4.3	Efficiency in LG	184
7.7.5	Bellman equations of the CLG model and free-entry	185
7.7.6	Price determination in CLG	187
7.7.7	Efficiency in CLG	187
8	The propagation of business cycles in CLG models	190
8.1	The discrete time CLG model	191
8.1.1	Search and matching in the goods markets	191
8.1.2	Timing of an investment projects	191
8.1.3	Disposable income and price determination	192
8.1.3.1	Value functions for consumers	193
8.1.3.2	Determining the dynamics of the goods market surplus and price	193
8.1.4	Other Markets	194
8.2	Equilibrium dynamics of the CLG model	195
8.2.1	Equilibrium	195
8.2.2	Job creation condition	195
8.2.3	A log-linear relation	196
8.3	Extension to endogenous search intensity in the goods market	197

8.4	Quantitative implications I: the propagation of productivity shocks	198
8.4.1	Calibration Strategy	198
8.4.2	Business cycle moments and impulse responses	200
8.5	Quantitative implications II: the propagation of demand shocks	201
8.5.1	The relation between utility, income and consumption	202
8.5.2	Fiscal innovations	203
8.5.3	Fiscal Multipliers	203
8.5.4	Calibration parameters	204
8.6	Discussion of the literature and remaining issues	205
8.7	Concluding words	207
8.8	Chapter Appendix	207
8.8.1	Appendix for Dynamics of CLG	207
8.8.2	Price and wage determination	208
8.8.2.1	Utility	208
8.8.2.2	Consumer Surplus	209
8.8.2.3	Firm Surplus	209
8.8.2.4	Goods Surplus	209
8.8.2.5	Sharing Rule of Consumption Surplus	209
8.8.2.6	Wage bargaining	210

GENERAL APPENDIX 212

CLG models under general assumptions on destruction shocks 213

A	The general entry equation in continuous time	213
A.1	Notation on turnover	213
A.2	Special cases	214
B	Price determination in CLG	215
C	Wage determination in stage g of CLG	216
D	A discrete time extended CLG model	218

Intensive margins in the CLG model 219

A	Endogenous search efforts in the goods market	219
A.1	Endogenous consumer search effort and the cyclicity of “shopping time”	219
A.2	Derivation of the model with shopping effort	220
A.3	Price determination with endogenous consumption effort	221
A.4	Wage determination with endogenous consumption effort	221
A.5	Job creation condition	222
B	Extension to bilateral effort in the goods market	223

C	Adding intensive search margins in labor and credit markets	223
C.1	Endogenous effort in financial markets	224
C.2	Search effort in the labor market	224
	Specific topics of the CL model: strategic bargaining and inefficient endogenous destructions	226
A	Strategic interaction within the firm	226
A.1	Sequential bargaining	226
A.2	The strategic use of debt	228
B	Inefficient job destruction and endogenous firm bankruptcies	229
	Specific topics of the CLG model: Varying the pool of customers	231
A	A general model with alternative assumptions on consumption	231
B	Stock-flow equations	232
C	Specific case 1: equilibrium with only employed consumers	232
D	Specific case 2: all agents consume.	233